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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS DUANE DANKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah
State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.
12874

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Thomas Duane Danks, appeals from
a decision of the Third Judicial District Court denying
his release from the Utah State Prison upon a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On January 3, 1972, Thomas Duane Danks filed a
complaint and petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
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alleging that his commitment to the Utah State Prison
was invalid. The matter came on for hearing on March
14, 1972, before Judge Joseph G. Jeppson, who denied
the petition on April 4, 1972.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent urges that this Court affirm the judgment of the court below which denied the appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 13, 1970, Thomas Duaine Danks was arrested for the robbery of Jack Elsbury. At 1 p.m. Officer
Floyd Ledford requested a warrant to search the Colonial
Village Motel, Tom Danks' residence, for money and
money bags. The supporting affidavit stated:
"On the date of October 13, 1970, at approximately 11 a.m., your affiant received information
from the victim of a robbery that occurred October
13, in which Thomas Danks was arrested and
searched by Officer Hardwick. I terns used in the
crime were found, and reason to believe that further items taken in the crime are at the residence
of Thomas Danks at the Colonial Motel at aforementioned address."

This evidence was admitted at trial.
On November 9, 1970, petitioner requested a ninetyday disposition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1
(1953). An information was filed on December 18, 1970.
A trial was set for February 2, 1971, but the prosecutor
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was unable to proceed because his subpoenas had not
been sent out. Defendant's counsel offered to proceed on
February 4, 1971, but the Court declined. February 7,
1971, was the ninetieth day, and fell on a Sunday. The
next day, February 8, 1971, was the date of the trial.
POINT I.
THE COURT BELOW HAD JURISDICTION
OVER THE OFFENSE AND THEREFORE,
THE DENIAL OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS WAS PROPER.
Appellant alleges that his conviction and the judgment entered thereon must be set aside because the Third
Judicial District Court was without jurisdiction because
he was not brought to trial within 90 days after having
made a request for final disposition. Utah Code Ann. §
77-65-1 (1953) provides:
"Whenever a person has entered upon a term
of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of this state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is
pending in this state any untried indictment, information, or complaint against the prisoner, he
shall be brought to trial within ninety days after
he shall have caused to be delivered to the county
attorney of the county in which the indictment, information or complaint is pending and the appropriate court written notice of the place of his
imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or
complaint: provided, that for good cause shown
in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being
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present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance ..."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-2 (1953), then provides:
"In the event that the action is not brought

to trial within the period of time as herein pro-

vided, no court of this state shall any longer have
jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried indictment, information or complaint be of any further
force or effect, and the court shall enter an order
dismissing the same with prejudice."
This court has interpreted these statutes in two recent cases. In State v. Belcher, 25 Utah 2d 37, 475 P. 2d
60 (1970), the facts show that a complaint was filed
against the defendant on August 6, 1969. On September
19, 1969, defendant made a request for final disposition
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 ( 1953) . On November
20, 1969, a preliminary hearing was held and the information was filed on November 26, 1969. The state was
granted a continuance for good cause shown on December
8, 1969, and a trial date was set for January 26, 1970. The
petitioner then asked the court to exonerate him because
he was not tried within 90 days from the date of his request for final disposition. Justice Ellett, speaking for
a unanimous court, said:
"There are several reasons why he cannot
properly be freed. In the first place, the court for
good cause shown continued the trial date; in the
second place, he could have been tried on
ber 8, 1969, except for his plea of insanity; and m
the third place, there was no way to dispose of the
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matter finally until the information was filed. His
request was premature. He could not enter a plea
of guilty to the complaint; and if the complaint
had been dismissed, the matter would not be disposed of finally, since the dismissal would not be
res judicata and another complaint could be filed
at any time with the statute of limitations (four
years from date of crime, Sec. 77-9-2, U. C. A.
1953) ."
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-65-1 and 2 were again the issue
in the case of State v. Bonny, 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P. 2d
147 (1970), decided two months after Belcher. The case
in Bonny was continued five days beyond the ninety-day
period to accommodate the defense. The Court held that
"if there is a reasonable basis in the record to support the
proposition that the trial court granted a continuance 'for
good cause shown' it was within his discretion and authority to do so." 477 P. 2d at 148. The Court further stated
that as long as the continuance took place within the
ninety-day period the Court maintained its jurisdiction.
The Bonny case was decided upon the issue of
whether the Court had good cause to continue the case.
However, the case could have been decided upon an
alternative ground as pointed out by Justice Ellett in his
concurring opinion where he stated:
"The defendant prematurely demanded final disposition of the case before the information was
filed. He was tried within the ninety days following the filing of the information." 25 Utah 2d at
119, 477 P. 2d at 148.
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It "is traditionally within the discretion of the trial
judge ... " to grant a continuance. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376
U. S. 575 at 589 (1964). Furthermore, the states are in
accord that this discretion shall not be disturbed unless
exercise of the discretion has been prejudicial t-0 the substantial rights of the defendant. Lofton v. People, 450
P. 2d 638 (Colo. 1969); Shelton v. Lamb, 460 P. 2d 156
(Nev. 1969); State v. Mathis, 7 Utah 2d 100, 319 P. 2d
134 (1957); State v. Polson, 448 P. 2d 229 (Ida. 1969).
The right of a judge t-0 grant a continuance is intimately connected with the right t-0 a speedy trial. The
United States Supreme Court has said that the right to
a speedy trial:
" ... 'is necessarily relative. It is consistant with
delays and depends on circumstances. It secures
rights t-0 a defendant. It does not preclude the
right of public justice.' (Citation omitted.)
'Whether delay in completing a prosecution . . .
amounts t-0 an unconstitutional deprivation of
rights depends on the circumstances ... The delay
must not be purposeful or oppressive.' (Citation
omitted.) '(T) he essential ingredient is orderly
expedition and not mere speed.'" (Emphasis
added.) United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116 at
120 (1966).
In the present action, the information was filed on
December 18, 1970, which would make the ninety-day
period run up to or past March 18, 1971. Petitioner's trial
was February 8, 1971, well within the ninety-day disposition period. Even if petitioner's arguments are valid, and
the
dr.ys were up on Sunday, February 7, 1971,
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the continuance was granted pursuant to statute (Rule
6 (a) U. R. C. P.) and the Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the continuance. Either way, the Court
had jurisdiction at the time it passed judgment and convicted appellant as the ninety-day period had not run.
Based solely on the holding in Belcher, supra, appellant's
contention that the trial court did not have jurisdiction
cannot stand.
The appellant's assertions in support of his position
are without merit. Appellant asserts that the unanimous
opinion in Belcher was "clearly" repudiated by Bonny,
a decision handed down only two months later. The basis
of this assertion is that Justice Ellett's concurring opinion said that another reason for the holding was that the
request was premature (i.e., reiterating the holding in
Belcher) while the majority of the court decided the case
on the basis that "good cause" for granting a continuance
was shown. It is highly improbable that this Court would
silently reverse a unanimous decision interpreting an important section of the criminal law and do so only two
months after that decision was handed down. There was
not even a hint or word of explanation in Bonny as to
why Belcher was allegedly being repudiated.
Appellant asserts that the language of Utah Code
Ann. § 77-65-1 (1953), itself supports the notion that
notice can be given before the information has been filed.
If it were any other way, appellant asserts, the right to
a speedy trial would mean little since the criminal process
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could take a long time from the period when the complaint is filed to the period when the information is filed.
This argument overlooks many other provisions in
the Code which prevent an excessive period from the time
the complaint is filed to the time the information is filed.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-12-14 (1953), provides that a defendant must be taken before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay." Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5 (1953), sets
out strict rules governing postponements at a preliminary
hearing. After the preliminary hearing and commitment
(Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-19, 20, 23 (1953)), the district
attorney has only 30 days to file an information or he is
in contempt of court. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-1 (1953).
In addition, every defendant has the general right to a
speedy trial. Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-8 (6) (1953). These
provisions, in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1
and 2 (1953) for prisoners, provide adequate safeguards
to guarantee the right to a speedy trial. Since other provisions in the Code adequately provide for a speedy trial,
appellant's assertion that this right can only be meaningful if a § 77-65-1 request can be filed before an information is clearly erreoneous.
It is also true that the majority of courts in other
states have not followed appellant's interpretation of similar "final disposition" statutes. In State v.
438
S. W. 2d 167 (Mo. 1969), the defendant-prisoner was
brought before a magistrate on July 18, 1966, to answer
a complaint charging him with larceny. He was granted
preliminary hearing on June 14, 1967. Defendant claimed

that he was denied the right to a speedy trial and that
if counsel had been provided when requested, he could
have taken advantage of the Missouri "180-day rule", §§
222.080 and 222.100, R. S. Mo. 1959, V. A. M. S., which
is very similar to Utah Code Ann., §§ 77-65-1 and 2
(1953). The court rejected this contention saying:

"The constitutional right to a speedy trial has no
application until a criminal prosecution is commenced. The constitutional provisions invoked
contemplate a pending charge and not merely a
pending complaint, which represents the mere possibility that a criminal charge will be filed." (Original emphasis.) Id. at 171.
The court went on to explain that the above statute
and the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial apply
only after an indictment or information is filed. Even
though denial of an immediate preliminary hearing was
illegal and destroyed the presumption of regularity of the
proceedings, the lower court did not lose jurisdiction
either under the statute or the Sixth Amendment because
the information was not filed until July 5, 1967. At the
time Coffey was decided, the statutory language had provided that the "180 Rule" applied only after an information or indictment had been filed.
However, the view that the right to a speedy trial
does not inure until after the filing of an information was
again upheld in this jurisdiction even after the Missouri
legislature amended the statute (see Mo. R. S., Cumulative Supplement, 1971, p. 220) to include the word "com-

l/..··
..

.
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plaint." State v. Bone, 473 S. W. 2d 681 (Mo. 1971). See
·· · also Harlow v. United States, 301 F. 2d 361 at 366 (5th
Circ. 1961), cert. den. 371 U. S. 814 (1962). C. F.
Edmiaston v. Neil, 452 F. 2d 494 (6th Circ. 1971).--:> }lc/i
f/J.

Appellant also claims that State v. Wilson, 22 Utah
2d 361, 453 P. 2d 158 (1969), stands for the proposition
that even when notice was filed before the information 4
the trial court was nonetheless held to have no jurisdiction because it had not brought the defendant to trial
within the 90 day period. This exact issue was never
raised in Wilson, and in any event, the subsequent
Belcher case is the only case which has spoken directly
to the issue of whether a request for final disposition can
be filed before the information. Belcher, therefore, not
Wilson, represents the precedent on this point.
Appellant complains that failure of the District Attorney's secretary to send out subpoenas was not "good
cause shown" for the granting of a continuance under
Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 (1953). Because of the secretary's oversight, the trial could not be held on February
2, 1971, as originally scheduled. The court, for its own
reasons, declined to hold the trial on February 4, 1971,
a Thursday. As a result the defendant was forced to
stand trial on the 91st day, Monday, February 8, 1971,
pursuant to Rule 6 (a) U. R. C. P., since trial could not
be held on Sunday, February 7, 1971. Appellant has not
shmvn or claimed any adverse or prejudicial effect rec:n1
from this delay of, at most, a few days. This Court

1
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has said that when a person duly convicted comes before
the court:
" ... it is not the proper function of the courts to
be hypercritical in scrutinizing proceedings in an
effort to discover some basis for relieving him from
the penalty the law demands ... because of some
technical defect or irregularity which had no actual adverse effect upon his rights or the outcome
of the phoceedings." Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah
2d 96 at 99, 440 P. 2d 968 at 970 (1968).
The delay complained of here resulted from mere
inadvertence or every day human carelessness. It was
neither "purposeful (n) or oppressive." Ewell, supra, p.
120. Appellant is asking this court to decide important
legal and policy matters on the basis of secretarial error.
This is a rather insubstantial reason for disturbing the
trial court's traditional exercise of discretion in granting
a continuance.
Since the facts of the case at the bar place the case
well within the constitutional standard regarding right to
a speedy trial, and within Utah case law, appellant should
not be granted relief on the ground that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction over the offense.

POINT II.
THE COURT BELOW WAS CORRECT IN
DENYING APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE
THE INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE INTRO-
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DUCED AT TRIAL WAS SEIZED UNDER
A VALID SEARCH WARRANT.
Petitioner's suggestions that the search of his motel
residence and any evidence obtained therefrom were illegal are totally unfounded.
The Fourth Amendment provides: "No warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U. S.
Const. Amend. IV.
Floyd Ledford, an officer of nine years who at the
time of the robbery was assigned to the police department
robbery detail, appeared on October 13, 1970, before Judge
Robert C. Gibson and in an affidavit in support of a search
warrant, described the place to be searched (Colonial
Village Motel, No. 5, 1530 South Main Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah). The affidavit clearly stated the things to
be seized (money and money bags, currency and change).
The affidavit further stated that the items to be seized
were stolan.
The victim of the robbery gave details of the robbery
to Officer Ledford and later Thomas Danks was arrested.
Items used in the crime were found on the person of
Thomas Danks. The affidavit also stated there was probable cause to believe further items were to be found at
the Thomas Danks residence at the Colonial Motel, No.
5. The robbery occurred at approximately 11: 00 a.m.,
on October 13, 1970, and the warrant was obtained approximately two (2) hours later at 1: 00 p.m.
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Upon completion of the affidavit, Officer Ledford
appeared before Judge Gibson and subscribed and swore
to the affidavit as is required by Utah Code Ann. § 7754-4 (1953), which states:
"The magistrate must, before issuing the warrant, examine on oath the complainant, and any
witnesses he may produce, and take their depositions in writing, and cause them to be subscribed
by the parties making them."
Whereafter, Judge Gibson being satisfied Officer
Ledford's affidavit set forth the facts tending to establish
the grounds of the application, or probable cause for believing that they exist, and believing their existence issued
a warrant, as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-6
( 1953), which requires:
"If the magistrate is thereupon satisfied of the
existence of the grounds of the application, or that
there is probable cause to believe their existence,
he must issue a search warrant, signed by him with
his official title, to a peace officer in his county,
commanding him forthwith to search the person
or place named for the property specified and to
bring it before the magistrate."

The search warrant was properly issued as provided
by appropriate constitutional and statutory law.
The petitioner, by and through his attorney, moved
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County to
suppress any items of evidence taken from the defendant
or his residence pursuant to a search warrant. The motion was made on the ground that the search warrant was
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issued without probable cause. A hearing on the matter
was set for January 11, 1971. The Honorable Bryant H.
Croft, Judge, denied the motion on January 13, 1971 (R.
11). Later at the trial on February 8, 1971, the attorney
again brought up the issue of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant and the Honorable Gordon R.
Hall, Judge, stated:
"The Court finds that there was probable
cause and as set forth in the affidavit. (T. 99 of
February 8, 1971.) "
This Court in adjudicating the reasonableness of the
search and seizure of evidence in State v. Crisco/a, 21
Utah 2d 272, 444 P. 2d 517 (1968), stated:
"Due to the responsibility of the trial court
in controlling the admissibility of evidence, and
his advantaged position to pass on such matters,
it is his prerogative to make this determination.
For those reasons, his ruling should be indulged
with a presumption of correctness and should not
be disturbed unless it clearly appears that he was
in error." 21 Utah 2d at 275.
There is no showing that the search warrant was not
issued properly or that evidence was not seized legally.
Furthermore, one city judge and two Third Judicial District judges have ruled that it was legal.
Petitioner cites several cases as authority for his
claims. None of the cases cited by the petitioner are
factually similar to the case at bar.
The first is Nathanson v. United States, 290 U. S.
41i [ict S. CL 11, 78 L. Ed. 159 (1933). In that case the
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affidavit stated that the affiant had "cause to suspect and
(did) believe that certain merchandise" was in the premises described.

In the case at bar, we are not concerned with an informer as in Nathanson. Furthermore, there was nothing
in Nathanson, either in the affidavit or in the other proof
introduced at trial, to suggest that any facts had been
brought out to support a reasonable belief or even a suspicion. Accordingly, the Court held that "(m) ere affirmance of belief or suspicion is not enough." 290 U. S. at
47. However, in the case at the bar, there is much more
than a "mere affirmance of belief or suspicion." The facts
point out vividly that it was the victim of the crime who
gave information concerning the crime. In addition, the
petitioner was already under arrest and it was he who gave
his address to the police. There was no informer involved
and no need to establish his veracity or identity for probable cause to exist.
In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12
L. Ed. 2d 223 (1964), the Court dealt with an Affidavit
that stated only:
"Affiants have received reliable information
from a credible person and do believe that heroin
. . . and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to
the provisions of the law." 378 U. S. at 109, 84
S. Ct. at 1511.
Again, this is factually distinguishable as we are not
concerned with information from an informer. Neverthe-
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less, the Aguilar test would still be satisfied under the
facts of this case. Under Aguilar, an affidavit must contain underlying facts and circumstances that would allow
a magistrate to independently judge the validity of the
informant's conclusion. In the case at bar, the following
facts are relevant: the victim had been interviewed by
police; items used in the crime were found on petitioner;
and petitioner's address was known to police. These facts,
without more, would certainly provide an underlying factual basis that would indicate to a reasonable man that
unrecovered items would be located at the suspect's residence. This satisfies the Aguilar standard.
Finally, petitioner cites Spinelli v. United States, 393
U. S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 589, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969), a narcotics case, in which an informer concluded that Spinelli
was running a bookmaking operation. A warrant was
thereupon issued. It should be pointed out that Spinelli
has been narrowed to the point that appellant's assertions
no longer correctly state the law. In United States v.
Harris, 403 U. S. 573, 29 L. Ed. 723, 91 S. Ct. 2075 (1971),
the majority stated its view by quoting the dissent in
Spinelli:
"A policeman's affidavit 'should not be judged as
an entry in an essay contest,' Spinelli, supra, at
438 (Fortas dissenting), but rather must be judged
by the facts it contains." 91 S. Ct. at 2080.
The Court also explained what constitutes a valid
tip. First, the information received must be based on the
personal and recent observations of the unidentified in·

1
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formant. In the case at the bar, the information came directly from the victim, whose observations were, of course,
personal and recent, and whose identity is known. Second,
there must be factors showing that the information was
gained in a reliable manner. The information in the case
at the bar was gained through the victim and by means
of a lawful search of the suspect. This is certainly more
reliable than a "word of mouth" tip from an unnamed
informer.
The Harris court distinguished Spinelli by pointing
out that the affidavit in Spinelli failed to spell out how
the informant came by his information. This is no problem in the case at the bar since an anonymous informant
is not in the same category as a victim, who would certainly have first hand knowledge of the crime in a case
of robbery. Also, information received first hand from
the victim is much more than the "mere suspicion" and
insufficient allegation condemned in Spinelli.
The Harris case emphasized the present approach of
the court in search warrant cases:

"In evaluating the showing of probable cause
necessary to support a search warrant, against the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures, we would do well to heed
the sound admonition of United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965):
'(T) he Fourth Amendment's commands,
all constitutional requirements, are practical
and not abstract. If the teachings of the
Court's cases are to be followed and the con-
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stitutional policy served, affidavits for search
warrants, such as the one here, must be tested
in a commonsense and realistic fashion. They
are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the
midst and haste of a criminal investigation.
Technical requirements of elaborate specificity
once exacted under common law pleadings
have no proper place in this area. A grudging
or negitive attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police
officers from submitting their evidence to a
judicial officer before acting.' 380 U. S. at 108.
Harris, supra at 578."
Appellant's construction of the affidavit in question is
the very sort of hypertechnicality which the Court condemned in both Harris and Ventresca.
None of petitioner's foregoing cases are factually similar or analogous to this action nor does his interpretation
thereof represent the present view of the Court. On the
contrary, cases cited by petitioner emphasize the factual
and legal differences between these cases and the case
at the bar.
There was certainly probable cause to arrest the defendant, and to search his residence with the warrant as
issued by the magistrate. The magistrate's actions were
proper and his determinations should not be limited but
should be paid great deference by reviewing courts. In
light of the foregoing discussion, petitioner's contentions
are meri tless.

1

1

19
CONCLUSION
Petitioner's allegations are without merit. Petitioner's first allegation that the ninety-day disposition requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 (1953), is not
applicable on at least three grounds.
A. The ninety-day period begins to run from the
date of the information and in this case had not expired.
B. The court for its own reasons continued the case
as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 (1953).
C. According to petitioner's allegation, the ninetieth
day would fall on a Sunday; therefore, the case would be
extended till Monday when court could be held.
Petitioner's second allegation is meritless in that the
search warrant was properly issued. The affidavit supporting the warrant stated probable cause to issue the
warrant; therefore any evidence seized under the use of
the warrant was admissible at the trial. Thus, neither
statutory nor constitutional rights were violated. The
respondent, therefore, requests that the trial court's judgment be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
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